Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2003

State of Utah v. Dewey Bud Cammack : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Bryan Jackson; J. Bryan Jackson, PC; attorneys for appellant.
Matthew D. Bates; assistant attorney general; Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; David E. Doxey;
Iron County attorney; attorneys for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Cammack, No. 20030122 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4201

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

r.nmirifil No 0115001145
Appellant Case No. 20030122-CA

vs.
DEWEY BUD CAMMACK,
Defendant/Appellant.
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REPLY OF APPELLANT CAMMACK
Appeal from the judgment, sentence, stay of execution of sentence, order of
lion (.ounty,

probation and i
State of Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, presiding.
MATTHEW D. BATES (9961)
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Post Office Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
(801)366-0180
(801) 366-0167 FAX
DAVID E. DOXEY
DEPUTY IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY
97 North Main Street, Suite 1
Post Office Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0428

(435) 586-6694
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

J. BRYAN JACKSON, (4488)
J. BRYAN JACKSON, P.C.
157 East Center Street
Post Office Box 519
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0519
Attorney for
Defendant/Appellant Cammack
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
******************************************

STATE OF UTAH,

REPLY OF APPELLANT
CAMMACK

Plaintiff/Appellee,
Criminal Case No. 011500845
vs.
Appellant Case No. 20030122-CA
DEWEY BUD CAMMACK,
Defendant/Appellant.

Argument Priority: (15)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

I.
JURISDICTION
Appellee agrees with Appellant that jurisdiction is appropriate before the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2003).
II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellee does not dispute the statement of facts submitted by the Appellant
and in fact states that the brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict. The Appellee then restates many of the facts that are set forth in Appellant's brief,
in some instances characterized differently but which more or less provide the same basic
information.
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11..
RESPONSE TO AND CLARIFICATION OF FACTUAL INFERENCES
POII

i

IT IS NOT REASONABLE TO INFER THAT THE ASSIGNMENT IN THE MATTER
INVOLVING PORTER WAS MORE THAN TO SECURE THE PAYMENT OF A DEBT
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in the final payment as he states at page Il II- Il • ::: f tf ne trial transcript;
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[The /\pp e ii a n t| expressed to me that he had a
contract, he was in need of some money and
was wanting to know if I'd be willing to advance
him some money if he gave me the contract, but
he was very adamant that he wanted to buy the
contract back".

Mr. Porter responded in the affirmative to the question from the State "Do you
think at that point, when 1ic [Appellant] when you signed that agreement that he
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Porter then states that he did not want to keep the contract, he wanted the Appellant
to pay the debt of $9,350.00. Under the circumstances, the question becomes
whether or not it is reasonable for the jury to draw the inference that Appellee
suggested in his response brief and in support of sufficient evidence for the crime of
theft. Appellant suggests that while it is likely that the jury did draw such an
inference the same is unreasonable and inappropriate in light of the testimony
presented at trial establishing that the assignment was for security and not an
absolute transfer of interest thus not requiring the transfer of the Granillo payments
in addition to the payment of the debt in the amount of $9,350.00.
POINT NUMBER 2:
THE CIRCUMSTANCE IS ONE THAT ALSO GOES TO THE ISSUE OF INTENT
TO DEFRAUD AND THERE IS NO SHOWING OF A SUFFICIENT
CONNECTION BETWEEN THE ACT OF FORGERY AND INTENT TO
DEFRAUD IN THE INSTANT CASE.
Because the act in the instant case involves Appellant's signing of Granillos'
name to a contract that was being used for security in the payment of a debt, as
opposed to the absolute assignment of a property interest in the contract, the mere
act of signing another's name without permission does not necessarily constitute a
forgery unless it is done with the intent to defraud Porter. While the document used
as collateral may have been altered, the obligation to pay was realized,
acknowledged and ultimately paid. In other words, the Appellant may have signed
another's name without permission and he may have even possessed an intent to
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defraud Granillos in doing so but the same is unrelated and completely separate
from his commitment to repay the debt to Porter. Consequently, no fraud was
committed. This is precisely what was found in State v. Winward. 909 P.2d 909 (Ut.
App. 1995) which involved a similar alteration of a document without permission but
no intent to defraud. Appellant contends that it is not reasonable to infer that he
intended to defraud Porter because Porter was only entitled to repayment of a debt
which was acknowledged by Appellant and ultimately paid.

Regarding the

collateral, Porter was only entitled to further assurance or additional collateral which
when offered by Appellant was refused by him. Since Porter was never entitled to
any benefit beyond the repayment of the debt upon the terms agreed, any further
interest realized by either party was purely incidental and not a matter of fraud.
POINT NUMBER 3:
APPELLANT HAS MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE
Appellant acknowledges that

in a matter involving the sufficiency of

evidence it is his responsibility to marshal the evidence. Appellant has attempted
to do so. Appellant has set forth the facts that support the findings made by the jury
verdict. Appellant has set forth the reasonable inferences drawn from those findings.
Appellee has suggested inferences that were overlooked by Appellant. However,
Appellant maintains that such inferences are not reasonable for the reasons set forth
above, namely that they are not supported by the testimony and evidence presented
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at trial. While Appellant contends that the concept of marshaling the evidence is
often an elusive one, placing a burden on Appellant unmatched in any other
argumentative context, the same should not be construed to also require the
inclusion of those inferences that are not reasonable nor supported by the
uncontroverted evidence in the case.
IV.
CONCLUSION
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above and also for those reasons set
forth in Appellant's brief, having replied to Appellee's brief, prays that relief be granted in
reversing the jury verdict, or remanded ordering that judgment be entered consistent with
Utah law, together with such and further relief as to this Court appears equitable and
proper.

DATED this 2$

da

V of

J. BRYAjq JACKSON,
Attorney for Appellant Cammack
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 2&& day of

April

, 20 Q\ , I did

mailed a true and correct photocopy of the REPLY OF APPELLANT CAMMACK, by
way of U.S. mail, postage fully prepaid, thereon, to the following:

MATTHEW BATES
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
PO BOX 140854
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
COURT OF APPEALS
PO BOX 140230
450 South State Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230
SCOTT GARRETT
IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY
P. O. Box 428
97 North Main Street, Suite 1
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0428
DEWEY B. CAMMACK
P.O. Box 1563
Cedar City, UT 84721-1563

LAURA LEE, Secretary
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